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Graf Research has been awarded an SBIR to produce one or more ASIC and FPGA hardware 3rd-Party IP (3PIP) assessment techniques, a set of technologies we collectively refer to as GR-3PIP. The techniques must accomplish the goal of establishing trust in the 3PIP under test, but we apply additional requirements. We require that the techniques (1) do not add significant cost to the core, (2) do not require extensive time to apply, and (3) do not require extensive verification or reverse engineering expertise to use.
Jonathan Graf will be presenting an "Overview of Game Theoretic Analysis Work" at the Air Force Trusted & Assured Microelectronics Symposium at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on August 30. Come on out and hear our talk!
Graf Research has been awarded a contract to create interfaces between our OpTrust software, which creates game-theory-based prescriptions for optimal hardware Trojan detection, and a prime contractor's custom electronic design automation tools.
Graf Research has been awarded a Phase 1 SBIR to research and develop optimal strategies for cloud-based trust assessment. We anticipate creating not only a novel cloud architecture that can facilitate the use of many of the DARPA-sponsored custom microelectronics trust software tools but also a unique, cloud-hosted software product OpTrust-C which will devise optimal strategies for the proper implementation of defensive measures.
Continuing our publication of the applications of Game Theory to various levels of trust assessment, we discuss system-level applications in our IEEE NAECON 2016 paper. Come on out and see our presentation!
Towards System-Level Adversary Attack Surface Modeling for Microelectronics Trust
Abstract—Models of trust for microelectronic systems are difficult to create due to the large variety of adversarial strategies available. Building on previous work, we present a new adversary model that considers the large heterogeneous attack surface that is realistically available on a diverse microelectronic system. We also present an expanded game theoretic model that permits reasoning about optimal adversarial and defensive strategies across this varied attack surface.